1 edition of Deterring terrorism found in the catalog.
2012 by Stanford Security Studies, an imprint of Stanford University Press in Stanford, California .
Written in English
Includes bibliographical references and index.
|Statement||edited by Andreas Wenger and Alex Wilner|
|LC Classifications||HV6431 .D4784 2012|
|The Physical Object|
|ISBN 10||9780804782487, 9780804782494|
|LC Control Number||2012009555|
The evidence suggests that terrorists tend to harbour varied, complex, even Deterring terrorism book strategic and personal aims. Breaking terrorism into its parts and processes helps identify the individual actors and processes that may be sensitive and vulnerable to the logic of deterrence. The latter relies on the logic of deterrence, compellence, and influence and involves manipulating an organization's willingness to use violence and its supporting community's enthusiasm to facilitate it. This is in keeping with the degree of difficulty, amount of time and expertise, and level of leadership that is required to coordinate effective suicide bombings.
Deterring Rational Fanatics provides a full-scale discussion of deterrence theory concepts and controversies, assessing the utility of relying on Deterring terrorism book logic of deterrence and coercion to counter contemporary terrorism. The primary methodological assumption is that a within and cross-case comparison of various Afghan targeted killings will reveal behavioral patterns on the part of the Taliban that inform particular aspects outlined in both the targeted-killing and deterrence literatures. In the language of deterrence theory, targeted killings represent a cost to planning and participating in political violence, a cost that should, in theory and in practice, influence or coerce group and individual militant behavior. Keywords: deterrence, counter-terrorism Introduction Traditional concepts of deterrence try to thwart unwanted behaviour by manipulating adversary incentives. Classical conceptions of deterrence are based on dissuading the adversary from unwanted behaviour by disincentivising it. This period also gave birth to the discussion of a cease-fire.
Not one shot was fired. This changed after the September 11 attacks. It suggests that former U. Participating in terrorist groups also supplies members with countless personal benefits beyond social solidarity. Denying terrorists from carrying out operationally successful attacks is a losing strategy for two main reasons. Process goals are intended to sustain the terrorist group by attracting media attention, scuttling organisation-threatening peace processes, or boosting membership and morale often by provoking government overreaction.
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More than a decade later, new research and theory are bringing deterrence back into currency as a viable counterterrorism strategy. Human influence operations.
There is a certain relationship between deterrence and the images of states that Deterring terrorism book perceived as allied against terrorist organizations. The paradigm Deterring terrorism book strategic deterrence, in which one state can cause damage to another on the strategic level, is almost never applicable towards terrorist organizations.
First, the ability of terrorists to generate violence depends critically on their level of support. One may say that effective deterrence has an element of dramaturgy; a gun that fires in the first act is no longer relevant for dramatic purposes in the last act.
Unfortunately, neither approach is likely to succeed since terrorists are generally motivated by such a wide variety of personal and strategic aims that they are liable to derive utility from their actions regardless of how governments respond.
The case studies presented here uncover an evolutionary process of learning, leading to strategic deterrence successes. Hezbollah, too, has a limited affinity with the host state, Lebanon.
International polls consistently show that when terrorism is seen as strategically advantageous, public support for the perpetrators increases.
If actors believe that they are unlikely to succeed or reap significant benefits from a certain course of action, they may be deterred from taking it.
The fear of deterrence by punishment could lead countries that are the potential sources of nuclear leakage to implement more effective strategies of deterrence by denial.
Al-Qaeda in Iraq is an illustrative example, as local support for it dried up once its attacks were seen as politically costly. Norton and Company, Inc. Coercing terrorists and influencing their behavior is not as impractical as skeptics assume.
In deterrence-by-denial, the point is to deter him by removing the potential value of his actions. Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. In deterrence-by-punishment, the threat of reprisal is intended to deter the adversary with unacceptable costs.
The authors in this book Deterring terrorism book many important and valuable contributions. Police Practice and Research, Vol. The Deterring terrorism book option was selected the fewest times, indicating that the rubric of preferences adequately captured respondent perceptions.
Alex S. In Octoberfor instance, a trove of letters written by Osama bin Deterring terrorism book was seized by Scotland Yard. Ultimately, when levers for deterrence of the patron state exist, the transfer of deterrence from the patron state to the nonstate proxy is not a complicated decision-making process.
His latest monograph on nuclear terrorism focuses on an issue that seems ripped from a Hollywood thriller, but is actually an all-too-real and growing threat to global security. Effective strategies on the state level to prevent nuclear terrorism will not eliminate non-state threats, but will go far in achieving that objective.
This model relates to terrorist organizations that have assets of their own but form a relationship with a state. This discussion leads to the exploration of a number of avenues for deterring terrorism.
Russia, which inherited the Soviet Union's vast nuclear arsenal and stocks of fissile material, recently terminated its nuclear security cooperation with the United States under the Nunn-Lugar program. The countries of primary concern with respect to the nexus of proliferation and terrorism--Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, and Russia--are each at an inflection point.
In their efforts to achieve parsimony, however, these models are often too reductive. Another channel for indirect deterrence of patron states has been the international community. And the territory terrorists may at times rule—in, for example, the ungoverned patches of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Iraq, Mali, Somalia, and Syria—almost always rests within the boundaries of an internationally recognized sovereign state, which complicates how military threats and operations can be issued and carried out.
A concern inherent to this methodology is the sacrificing of external validity for precision.Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States asserts that bad offences and defences have been endemic to the current US policy approach, leading US policy makers to pursue policies that require them to do everything without adequate concern for resource trade.
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Deterring terrorism: theory and practice. [Andreas Wenger; Alex S Wilner;] -- This book brings together prominent theorists to discuss the topic of deterrence in counterterrorism, offering a comprehensive overview of both the theory and practice. Deterring Terrorism: Theory and Practice (Stanford Security Studies) [Andreas Wenger] on 42comusa.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers.
During the Cold War, deterrence theory was the cornerstone of U.S. Deterring terrorism book policy. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacksAuthor: Deterring terrorism book Wenger.An important component of deterrence against terrorism is the perception by the pdf organization that the deterring state enjoys “intelligence dominance.” Israel has enjoyed an image of an intelligence superpower with the ability to target terrorist leaders (and even state targets) at will.Sep 19, · During the Cold War, download pdf theory was the cornerstone of U.S.
foreign policy. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, however, popular wisdom dictated that terrorist organizations and radical fanatics could not be deterred—and governments shifted their attention to combating terrorism rather than deterring it.
This book challenges that prevailing assumption and offers insight as to when.Feb 16, · Abstract. Many scholars ebook policymakers argue that deterrence strategies have no ebook role to play in counterterrorism.
The case against deterrence rests on three pillars: terrorists are irrational; they value their political ends far above anything deterring states could hold at risk; and they are impossible to find.